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LAY ATTORNEYS
IN THE TRIBUNAL
REV. ADAM J. MAIDA *

T

earlier this year that the Diocese of Pittsburgh
would use lay advocates in the ecclesiastical tribunal has prompted
extensive inquiry from Diocesan Courts across the country. Since
we have received over one-hundred requests for information concerning our experiment, it will be my purpose to share with you the
fruits of this experiment, to answer some of the questions which have
been asked of our tribunal, and to give you an appraisal of this
program and of the hope that it offers for the future.
HE ANNOUNCEMENT

There were three primary considerations which prompted us
to use civil attorneys as advocates in our marriage tribunals: (1) the
documents of Vatican II underline and encourage the role of the
layman in every phase of the Church's life; (2) the Council underscored the responsibility and the obligation of the layman to become
involved in all phases of the Christian Apostolate; and, (3) the layman is anxious for an opportunity to serve his Church and his fellow
man, especially in the various professions in which he has been
trained.
With these general considerations in the background, the occasion
which acted as a catalyst in our decision to bring civil attorneys into
the tribunal was a telephone call, in 1964, from the Dean of the
Law School at Duquesne University. A prospective client had asked
the Dean to recommend the finest civil lawyer in the city to represent
him before the tribunal of the Diocese of Pittsburgh. Obviously
there was none. When I related the call to our tribunal personnel,
we all wondered why we couldn't make such representation available. Why could we not have a corps of attorneys who would be
B.A., St. Vincent's Seminary; J.C.L., Latern University; J.D., Duquesne
University Law School; Assistant Chancellor, Diocese of Pittsburgh.
*
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available to serve in marriage cases when
requested to do so?
Two recent articles dealing with the
subject, appearing in a professional periodical, concluded that the use of lay
advocates in Church tribunals was an
impractical idea in America because:
(1) The civil lawyer had no knowledge
of Canon law and could hardly take the
time from his profession to acquire a
canonical degree or sufficient knowledge.
(2) All of the significant marriage jurisprudence was in Latin and most civil
lawyers were incapable of coping with
the language factor.
(3) Time and advice are the tools of
a lawyer's trade and his fees are measured
accordingly.
Neither the tribunals nor
the petitioners could afford to pay a civil
lawyer the going rate for his time.
(4) There would not be sufficient interest among the lawyers for this work
and even if they were interested, they
would not realistically have the time to
do the work.
A careful analysis of these objections
led us to the conclusion that none were
insurmountable in view of the tremendous
advantages lay advocates could bring to
Church tribunals. To provide a minimal
knowledge of Canon law and to give
attorneys a feel for the code, a course
was designed in which the lawyers
received twenty hours of instruction.
Our Officialis outlined very generally the
contents of the code, its history, and its
purpose; one of our theologians gave a
lecture on the theology of marriage; our
Chancellor discussed the impediments and
dispensations; the Secretary of our tribunal
lectured on judicial procedure; the director of our family life office in the

Diocese gave an instruction on separation
and divorce procedures, and I gave the
instructions on rotal jurisprudence. Most
important, however, was the first twohour session in which Bishop Wright informally sat down with the attorneys and
discussed the hopes he had for the group,
encouraging them to give their best
efforts to the pilot project. This first
session set the tone for all the subsequent
meetings and its spirit still lingers in the
generous way in which these attorneys
serve in our tribunal. Obviously, none of
these lectures was exhaustive; they were
merely introductory. In addition to these
general instructions, each lawyer was
given a copy of The Catholic Lawyer,
volume 12, no. 1, Winter, 1966, which
was dedicated to a study of the ecclesiastical tribunal, its structure and personnel
and which in essence consisted of a
reproduction of the papers given at a
symposium held at Fordham University in
the Spring of 1966, under the auspices
of Fordham University and the Archdiocese of New York.
The objection that most ecclesiastical
jurisprudence was in Latin was not as
difficult an objection to overcome as
might first appear. The limited number of
grounds upon which a nullity can be
granted in the Church have each been
the subject matter of doctoral theses
published by the Canon Law School at
Catholic University. We have a complete
set of these in our library. Furthermore,
the library contains a set of The Jurist
which has treated most of the grounds
for annulments and the particular problems involved in proving them. Last year,
the Canon Law Society made available
to us a little booklet on tribunal jurispru-
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Early this year, the decisions
dence.
published in 1966 by the Archdiocese of
New York in first and second instance
were made available to us. Each attorney was given a complete set of these
decisions, containing in some two hundred and fifty pages all possible grounds
for attacking the validity of a marriage
and illustrating each of these grounds in
different factual situations. In addition,
our own file of cases and decisions is
open for study and analysis by the lay
advocate. Finally, if any point of law is
unclear or needs further clarification, a
priest is made available to the lay advocate as a translator of pertinent rotal
decisions.
The problem of fees has temporarily
been resolved. During the course of
instruction for the lawyers, while joking
about legal fees, one of the lawyers
speaking for the group wanted it understood that none of them expected any
fees for their work. As professional men,
they wanted to make this project a part
of their apostolate in the Church. In
order that no one would be overburdened
in his generosity, it is contemplated that
each lawyer will receive one or perhaps two
cases a year. To illustrate the seriousness
of this problem, we asked the lawyers
to keep a record of the time they devote
to a case. In an easy case just completed,
the attorney told us that he devoted sixty
hours to preparation. Given the ordinary
hourly rate for legal services rendered, in
this case the cost to the petitioner would
have been $2,100. While the problem
has been temporarily overcome, I do not
know what the ultimate solution will be.
The interest of the lawyers in the
program has been simply fantastic. In
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fact we have a waiting list of attorneys
who want to be approved for practice
before our court. They seem willing to
give as much time as is necessary to
insure the success of our project and to
give proper representation before the
court.
The contributions made by the lay
advocates in our Pittsburgh Courts are
worthy of note. These successful, dedicated, practicing lawyers have introduced
a professional spirit into the tribunal.
These are men who are masters at discovering evidence and applying its relevancy to the issues before the court.
Their search for witnesses is unrelenting
and they are expert at preparing a witness to give meaningful testimony. It is
a great pleasure to work with men who
understand concepts of law and can make
subtle legal distinctions and apply them
to varying factual situations. They know
the value of a good brief and do an
excellent job in formulating an argument
in behalf of their client.
The lay advocate has infused into our
judicial system many of those qualities
which have already made him a very
successful civil attorney. The preparation
of his case is extremely thorough and
A wonderful rapport
well organized.
exists between the attorney and his client,
and the petitioner and witnesses seem to
have a greater confidence in the attorney
than they have in a priest-advocate. The
petitioner, who feels he is getting maximum legal advice and protection and
knows he is being competently represented
in the ecclesiastical tribunal, seems to
identify much more realistically with a
lay advocate than he did with a priest
who served as advocate. In fact, when
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given the choice between one of the lay
advocates and a priest-advocate, the
petitioner will inevitably choose the lay
attorney, and with good reason. In our
experience, the lay attorney will spend
hours with the petitioner and his witnesses
prior to any formal proceeding in the
court. The lay attorney would not think
of permitting any interrogation of his
client or his witnesses in his absence. The
very presence of the lay attorney in the
courtroom with the petitioner, the respondent and the witnesses has produced a
very sobering atmosphere and a certain
quieting feeling in those who are asked
to testify.
Furthermore, the use of the lay attorney has had a good effect on our tribunal. The judges, with one exception,
are all pastors in busy parishes who, in
the past, looked upon the part of a judge
as an ancillary function of their priestly
lives. Now, however, the judge, lest he
be shamed by an aggressive and intelligent attorney, is forced to study the law
and become acquainted with the minutest
details of judicial procedure. Any structure which is closed and inbred, whose
deliberations are secret and sometimes
mysterious, can tend to take itself for
granted and can become sluggish in
executing the purpose for which it exists.
The introduction of lay attorneys keeps
the judges sharp and constantly aware of
the fundamental and noble reasons why
they sit in judgment over their fellow
Christians.
The use of lay advocates has made it
possible, or should I say forced us, to
hear many more cases than we have ever
heard before and in record time. The first
two cases presented by lay advocates

have been concluded in seven months. In
1965, three formal cases were heard, and
in 1966, two cases were heard. In 1967,
twelve cases were introduced, half of
which were concluded during that year
It
and the others early in 1968.
is interesting to note that the first two
decisions in which lay advocates were involved have been affirmative.
Finally, the use of lay advocates in the
tribunal constitutes a tremendous saving
in priestly manpower and frees many
priests from the obligation of representing
people before the court. In our Diocese
this has a twofold blessing in that it
enables the priest to devote his time to
other priestly work and it avoids imposing upon the priest a work for which
he is totally unqualified and unprepared.
This is to say nothing of the matter of
justice, wherein the petitioner is now
adequately represented by competent
counsel.
The use of lay advocates has not
been without its difficulties.
For example, all the advocates practicing
before our court are very successful civil attorneys and it has been
frustrating at times to schedule a hearing,
with full court, including notaries, witnesses and judges, only to find the busy
lay attorney asking for a continuance
because of some urgency in his civil practice. In addition, there has been a significant stress placed on the tribunal staff.
The three priests who staff the tribunal
find themselves busier than ever. A
fourth full-time girl was added recently
to the secretarial staff. The increased
work load has resulted in additional costs
and expenses for machines and manpower.
Moreover, despite an elaborate screening
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procedure, two of the eighteen attorneys
chosen for this work have not followed
through on their original commitment.
After eight months of experience with
our tribunal, I asked the lay attorneys for
their observations and their evaluation of
our judicial system and they rendered
some of the following criticisms:
(1) They feel it is fundamentally unfair and unjust to assert that the plaintiff
must prove his case and then deny him
the opportunity to come forward with his
proof by not allowing the attorney for
the plaintiff to examine witnesses and
elicit from them the testimony needed.
No right to effectively cross-examine is
granted. The Defender of the Bond, in
preparing his questions, will necessarily
prepare them in sympathy with his official
position. In any event, except in a very
general way, he doesn't even know what
the plaintiff intends to prove, how he will
prove it, what witnesses he will call and
what testimony they are prepared to give.
The judge in asking the questions may
well be even less prepared and competent
to assist the plaintiff in proving his allegations. To the lay attorney this is a gross
violation of due process which is rooted
in the natural law.
(2) In order to compensate for the
deficiencies and injustices which may
arise because of this fundamental prejudice against the plaintiff, after the judge
has asked all the questions prepared by
the Defender of the Bond, we have permitted the advocate to ask any questions
which might have some bearing on the
case. These questions are accepted by
the judge as his ex officio questions as
long as he or the Defender of the Bond
has no serious objection. This has not
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been completely satisfactory because many
points are not developed within the context of the original interrogation and the
testimony of a witness often loses its
full force. Consequently, at a recent
meeting among the members of the tribunal and the lay advocates, it has been
decided that in the future, all questions
would be drawn up by the Defender of
the Bond in consultation with the lay
advocate and the lay advocate will be
permitted to ask any questions in the
course of interrogation which may be
necessary or pertinent. In this way, the
testimony elicited from witnesses should
flow coherently and logically.
(3) The attorneys were critical of our
use of notaries. In civil courts, every
word of a witness is recorded and is considered important. In our court, even
with the use of electronic devices (stenomasks), much of the testimony is a
detailed summary of what the witness
said. When our advocates go to other
courts where notaries write down in long
hand what testimony witnesses give, they
are hopelessly dismayed.
(4) With only brief experience in our
courts, it was evident to the experienced
lawyer that our judges were not trained
in the law. If it is justice which the
plaintiff seeks, the advocates contend, it
ought to be meted out by men who are
thoroughly familiar with the law and its
procedures.
(5) Our system of appeal, i.e., the
need for two affirmative decisions, is to
them a classic example of double jeopardy
and consequently a violation of fundamental due process. They have suggested
that when the court of first instance gives
(Continued on page 87)
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in revamping outmoded legal procedures
generally and in encouraging more widespread use of group practice for those
well above the poverty line but too poor
to afford effective and continuing legal
representation."6
Today, it is generally conceded that
though indigents cannot even begin to
think about hiring a lawyer, middle-income people in the big cities, especially,
will also think twice before doing so.

36 Paulsen,

Services-l,
(1965).

The Expanding Horizons of Legal
67 W. VA. L. REv. 267, 277
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an affirmative decision that it also be
affirmed on appeal except in those cases
where the facts in no way support the
decision of the court of first instance or
where there has been a gross violation of
procedural law. They argue that the
court of first instance is better prepared
to grant a just decision because it has
had all the parties before it. And ultimately, who is to say that three prudent
men in Pittsburgh are more or less wise
than three prudent men in Chicago, New
York or San Francisco in reaching a

The cost of an urban lawyer's services,
except for real estate closings where
cash in hand or a new home tend to
give a glow to the transaction, or personal
injury litigation, where almost everyone
recovers, for most citizens is usually
disproportionate to the results achieved,
and, therefore, a luxury item.
The fault in most cases is not attributable to the lawyer himself. He has no
choice but to charge for the many hours
he spends in a lower court, not to speak
of the discourtesies he endures, waiting
for a calendar call on a single claim
worth one or two thousand dollars. The
fault, instead, lies with an archaic and
rigid system which, in practice, imposes
a sacrosanct attorney-client relationship
on all except the truly affluent.

decision on the validity of a marriage. If
we are not prepared to change Canon
1014 in favor of the person, and if we
cannot change Pur system of appeals,
perhaps this suggestion can be the first
step in giving a new and greater hope to
those who seek the justice of the
ecclesiastical tribunal.
(6) Finally, unlike the common law
with which the lay advocate is familiar,
they find our law too strict and rigid.
There is little room for creativity. Like
the common law, they feel that canon law
ought to live and breathe and realistically
reflect the needs of our people within the
context of their existential experience.

